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WE'RE TALKING ABOUT PRACTICE: IN DEFENSE OF THE
GAMES PLAYED METHOD OF APPORTIONMENT AND
OTHER STATUTES AIMED AT ATHLETES
Alex Mattingly
I. INTRODUCTION
America has always been fascinated by sports, and perhaps no more
so than now. As sports have become increasingly popular, profitability
has increased as well-evident by the rise in player salaries, multi-
million dollar sponsorships, and naming rights-all of which have led to
increased valuations for sports franchises. 1  Accordingly, cities,
counties, and states have been increasingly attracted to the economic,
urban development, and symbolic benefits a sports franchise can bring
to a region. 2 However, because of the monopoly power that exists in the
major sports leagues-the MLB, NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLS-although
demand for sports is on the rise, supply remains stagnant. The question
remains: how are cities supposed to attract major sports franchises to
their areas?
Enter the concept of the public/private partnership. In exchange for
benefits accompanying the establishment of a local sports franchise in a
city, county, or state, these municipalities will finance a large portion of
sports complexes from public funds. These deals are seemingly
beneficial for both parties, as long as the costs do not outweigh the
benefits. Unfortunately, the costs associated with publicly financed
partnerships are typically downplayed to the public. The cost of
building the structure is often visible to the public eye and represents a
large cost,3 but the costs associated with the land and infrastructure, and
the ongoing costs of operations, capital improvement, municipal
services, and foregone property taxes, are also significant and often
overlooked.4 The costs of stadiums have increased over the last decade,
as well as the public share of the cost. 5 Because the public is taking on a
larger burden of the stadium cost and deals are being structured without
analyzing the full cost to the public for the construction of a stadium, the
1. JUDITH GRANT LONG, PUBLIC/ PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR MAJOR LEAGUE SPORTS
FACILITIES 5 (2013).
2. Id. at 7.
3. The cost of a stadium on its own is large; the average NFL stadium costs $488 million, of
which eighty-seven percent is paid by the public partner. Id. at 84.
4. "Based on an analysis of all 121 sports facilities in use during the 2010 season for MLB,
NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLS, the result of adjusting for these omissions is to increase the average public
cost by $89 million per facility to a total of $259 million .... " Id. at 80.
5. See id. at 88-92.
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revenue recovered by the public is often less than the cost of building it.6
If a state or locality cannot recover the cost of a stadium from the
revenue generated by the stadium, is it rational to tax the players that
directly benefit from the construction of these cathedrals of the game?
Two issues were brought before the Ohio Supreme Court in two cases
that seek to answer this question. Specifically, these cases concerned
the state and local taxation issues associated with two nonresident
professional football players, Hunter Hillenmeyer and Jeff Saturday, for
their involvement in games played outside of their teams' respective
home states. Both players argued that states and localities do not have
constitutional authority to tax nonresident athletes by apportioning their
income on a "games played method" of taxation. This method divvies
up personal income to a state in proportion to the ratio of games played
by a player within that state divided by the total amount of games
played. By contrast, the two players argued for a "duty days" method of
apportionment, whichi would apportion the taxpayer's personal income
to the state in proportion to the amount of days the players were
contractually obligated to perform in a state (duty days) by the total
amount of duty days in the year. The players argued that the games
played method of apportionment violates the Due Process Clause and
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Additionally,
players also challenged state statutes that distinguish athletes and
entertainers from all other taxpayers, arguing that such statutes violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 7
This Comment seeks to examine the issues raised by the Hillenmeyer
and Saturday cases. To properly analyze these issues, it is important to
first determine whether states and localities have the power to tax
personal income, and how the Constitution restricts state and locality
taxing powers. Part II of this Comment discusses the power of state and
local taxation, and Part III discusses the restrictions on state and local
taxation. Part IV, describes the apportionment of taxation on
professional athletes' salaries, including an overview of how state and
federal courts have analyzed this issue, as well as Federal Tax
Administration recommendations. Part V highlights the cases decided
by the Ohio Supreme Court. These cases clearly lay out the arguments
from both sides on the issue of apportionment and the issue of statutory
discrimination. Part VI argues why the games played method of
apportionment is Constitutional while Part VII analyzes why state and
local statutes that single out professional athletes and entertainers are
Constitutional. Finally, Part VIII concludes with a recap of the issues
6. Id. at 13-14.
7. Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland Bd. of Review, 41 N.E.3d 1164 (Ohio 2015); Saturday v.
Cleveland Bd. of Review, 33 N.E.3d 46 (Ohio 2015).
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involved, and how legislatures should, and courts must, proceed in the
future.
II. THE POWER OF STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
The question of whether state governments have the power of
taxation begins with the determination of whether a taxpayer falls within
the state's jurisdiction. 8 The jurisdiction of state taxation can come from
either the domicile of the taxpayer or the location of the source of
income. 9 A state has the authority to tax a resident of that state on
income from whatever source derived, regardless of whether the income
was derived from within the state. 1° This power to tax residents was
established in Cohn v. Graves, where the United States Supreme Court
decided that state taxation of its residents is "universally recognized"
and that residence alone is sufficient for taxation of the resident's entire
income. 11
States may also tax nonresidents on income derived within the state.
In 1920, the Supreme Court upheld state personal income taxation on
nonresidents in Shaffer v. Carter.12 There, the Court upheld a state tax
by Oklahoma levied on income derived from oil and gas producing
properties in the state. 13 This tax covered residents and nonresidents
alike. 14  The Court held, like income from residents, income of
nonresidents derived within the taxing state is appropriate to tax and the
state may "levy a duty of like character, and not more onerous in its
effect, upon incomes accruing to nonresidents from their property or
business within the State, or their occupations carried on therein."' 15 But
unlike the all-encompassing taxation on income of residents, the
taxation on nonresidents is limited. Where the jurisdiction to taxation of
residents extends to all income, the jurisdiction of nonresident income"extends only to their property owned within the State and their
business, trade, or profession carried on therein, and the tax is only on
such income as is derived from those sources."' 16
In a companion case to Shaffer, the Court also upheld a New York tax
8. 1-9 BENDER'S STATE TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE § 9.14 (Charles W. Swenson
ed., Matthew Bender 2009).
9. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462-63 (1995); Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
10. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
11. Id. at313-15.
12. 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
13. Id. at45.
14. Id. at 52.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 57.
2016]
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on nonresident employees working in New York. 17 The Court held that
states have "complete dominion over all persons, property, and business
transactions within their borders" except when restricted by the
Constitution. 18 This power is justified because the states "assume and
perform the duty of preserving and protecting all such persons, property,
and business, and, in consequence, have the power normally pertaining
to governments to resort to all reasonable forms of taxation in order to
defray the governmental expenses." 19
Localities also have looked to personal income tax to raise funds for
local governments. Localities derive their power to tax from the
state's power.21 A state can delegate a locality to impose any tax that a
state may impose, so long as it does not violate uniformity or
impermissibly discriminate.2  Although there are fewer states that allow
localities to impose income tax on both residents and nonresidents than
states that levy a personal income tax, the number has increased over
time, attributable to recurring urban fiscal crises. 23 Philadelphia was the
first locality to impose a personal income tax in 1938, and now, fourteen
states and over 4,000 localities have levied local income taxes. 24 For
example, cities such as Cincinnati, Columbus, Detroit, Kansas City,
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and San Francisco all currently
impose a local income tax.25
III. RESTRICTIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Although the Supreme Court has granted states the ability to tax, that
ability is limited insofar as that taxation may not violate the United
States Constitution. The three main restrictions of the Constitution that
limit the taxing powers of the states are the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Equal
Protection Clause. States cannot tax those who are not under their
jurisdiction. There are separate tests for jurisdiction under both the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses.
The arguments that are brought against the games played method of
personal income apportionment are that it violates the Due Process and
17. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
18. Shaffer, 252 U.S. at 50.
19. Id.





25. 2-29 BENDER'S STATE TAXATION, supra note 8, at § 29.02.
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Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. It has also been argued that the
state and local statutes that single out professional athletes and
entertainers violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
Before arguing this claim, it is important to first understand the
regulations that are placed on state and municipal governments by the
Constitution.
A. Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no
state shall, "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... ,,2 A state tax is a deprivation of the taxpayer's
property and therefore must be levied in accordance with the Due
Process Clause. For a state to establish due process, there must be a
connection between the taxpayer and the state. The taxpayer must have,"some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.' 27 The Supreme Court
has gone on to state "income attributed to the State for tax purposes
must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing State."28
Furthermore, in International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of
Transportation, the Supreme Court explained that "[a] state may tax
such part of the income of a non-resident as is fairly attributable either
to property located in the state or to events or transactions [] occurring
there[.]"29
Not only must the state establish that a taxpayer has minimum
contacts in the state, but the tax must also be rationally apportioned to
the activity in the state. A state tax on a nonresident that is not
rationally apportioned to the services provided by the state is a violation
of the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has ruled that the
taxpayer holds the burden of proof to show that a tax is unfairly
apportioned, stating "when the state has adopted a method not
intrinsically arbitrary, it will be sustained until proof is offered of an
unreasonable and arbitrary application in particular cases." 30
Because multiple states can tax one person on the basis of both source
and residence, taxpayers may be subject to double taxation or taxation
from multiple states from the same source of income. The Supreme
Court has held that such double taxation by multiple states does not, by
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. Miller Bros. Co. v. Md., 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
28. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
29. 322 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1944).
30. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. N.C. ex rel Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 133 (1931).
2016]
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itself, violate the Due Process Clause.3 1  Additionally, it is not a
violation of the Due Process Clause for multiple states to enforce a tax
for the same source of income. However, to avoid the issue of double
taxation on personal income, many states provide credits to their
residents on the taxes paid to other states.
32
A taxpayer might also be liable to double taxation if two states have
different source rule definitions. 33  The Due Process Clause will not
limit states from adopting their own source rules, as long as the taxpayer
has minimum contacts with that state and the income attributed to the
state is rationally related. Although states with different source rules




The Supreme Court has held, even if a state tax passes the "minimum
contacts" requirement of the Due Process Clause, this does not
necessarily mean that the Commerce Clause requirement has been
passed.35 In Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, the issue before the
Court was the collection of a use tax on a nonresident corporation.
36
Although the corporation had personally availed itself to the state under
notice and fundamental fairness, the Court held it would not obliterate
the sharp distinction that the Court had previously made between''minimum contacts" for the due process clause and "substantial nexus"
for the Commerce Clause.37
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with
the Indian tribes." 38 The Court has interpreted the dormant power of the
Commerce Clause to mean that, not only is regulation of interstate
commerce a federal power, but this federal power prohibits states from
31. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1939); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305
U.S. 19,23 (1938).
32. WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 386 (9th ed. 2009). A credit is a
dollar for dollar tax forgiveness against taxes owed to a state. For example, if a taxpayer was a resident
of state A, and owed $500 to state A for personal income, then the taxpayer would be liable for $500 to
state A. But if the taxpayer was also taxed $400 on the same income by state B, the taxpayer would
have a $400 credit against the $500 taxes liable to state A, and would therefore only be liable for $100
on taxes for state A.
33. Id. at 427-28.
34. Id. at 388.
35. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
36. Id. at 302.
37. Id. at 311.
38. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
[VOL. 84
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exerting the same power. 39  Therefore, states are prohibited from
exerting power that would unduly burden interstate commerce. A tax
that would unduly burden interstate commerce would fall under the
dormant power of the Commerce Clause and would be unconstitutional.
The current test for sustaining a state tax under the Commerce Clause
was presented by the Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady.40  In Complete Auto, a Michigan corporation challenged the
constitutionality of a Mississippi tax under the Commerce Clause. The
tax levied afainst the corporation was for activity performed solely in
Mississippi. The corporation was taxed for its conduct in shipping
goods from two points within the state.4 2 The Court directly overruled
the per se rule of limiting taxation on interstate commerce and held that
the Mississippi tax did not violate the Due Process or the Commerce
Clause.43 Along with a Due Process analysis, the Court provided a four-
pronged test to determine if a tax could be sustained under the
Commerce Clause. For a state tax to be in compliance with the
Commerce Clause, the tax must: (1) apply to an activity with substantial
nexus to the state; (2) be fairly apportioned; (3) not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and (4) be fairly related to the services provided by
the state.44
With regard to the first prong, the Court has held that the substantial
nexus requirement is a different standard than the minimum contacts
requirements from the Due Process Clause. The Court held in Quill that
it would not overturn the bright line physical presence test that was
established by the Supreme Court in Bella Hess45 for sales and use
taxes. 46 Although created by the Court in Quill, lower courts have had
difficulty applying the distinction between minimum contacts and
substantial nexus. Courts have struggled to determine if the physical
presence test that distinguishes the minimum contacts standard from the
substantial nexus standard is only applicable to sales and use tax or all
taxes.4 7
The second prong of the Complete Auto test states that the tax must
39. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309.
40. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
41. Id. at 275-76.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 288-89.
44. Id. at 279.
45. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
46. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
47. See Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006); J.C. Penney
Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
2016]
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be fairly apportioned. 4 8 This means that a state may not enforce a tax
against a taxpayer that is not in relation to the amount of work done in
that state. In Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New
York,49 the New York Court of Appeals held that a New York state tax
on the entirety of a law professor's salary was neither a violation of the
Due Process Clause nor the Commerce Clause.50 The taxpayer in this
case challenged only the second prong of the Complete Auto test,
arguing that the tax was not fairly apportioned. The taxpayer, a
nonresident, argued that the tax should be attributed to New York based
on only the amount of days he commuted to New York.
51
New York, on the other hand, apportioned the tax based on "the
convenience of the employer" test. This test apportions income to the
state based on the amount of days worked in New York divided by the
total amount of days worked in the year. However, under New York's
apportionment, days of work attributed to another state besides New
York may only be attributed if the work outside the state is a necessity,
not merely a convenience.5 2 Therefore, under this test, the days worked
by a law professor from his home in New Jersey were counted as days
of work in New York.53 The professor's job was in New York, and the
only reason he was not working in New York was because it was more
convenient for him to work from home instead of his office at the law
school.54
The court upheld the tax based on apportionment by the convenience
of the employer test because it was both internally and externally
consistent. 5 Internal consistency exists if double taxation would not
otherwise exist if every state applied the same tax. 56 The court found
that if every state used the convenience of employer test, then only New
York would have a right to the taxation of the professor's income.
5 7
Therefore, the tax was internally consistent. External consistency exists
when the state's justification for taxation is attributable to economic
activity within the state. 5 8 When a state has chosen an apportionment
method, it is the burden of the taxpayer to show that the tax has beengrossly distorted. The court found that the professor's work at home
48. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 259, 279 (1977).
49. 801 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2003).
50. Id. at 845.
51. Id. at 844.
52. Id. at 845.
53. Id.
54. Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 843.
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was auxiliary to his work in New York. 59 His work at home was for his
employment in New York. Simply because he chose to cross state lines
did not make him an interstate actor.60 Because the taxpayer could not
show a lack of external consistency, the court ruled that the tax was
externally consistent. 61 The Court held that because the tax was both
internally and externally consistent, it was fairly apportioned, and
therefore passed the second prong of the Complete Auto test.62
The third prong of Complete Auto requires that the tax not
discriminate against interstate commerce. 63 This means that a state tax
may not discriminate against nonresident activity in the state by creating
a tax that unduly burdens interstate commerce. The Supreme Court held
in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner64 that a tax was
unconstitutional because it violated the third prong of the Complete Auto
test. Scheiner involved a Pennsylvania tax applied on truckers for the
operation of trucks in the state.65 The tax was a flat fee that did not
differentiate between truckers simply passing through Pennsylvania and
those traveling exclusively in the state. 66 The Court held that the tax
was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because it did not pass
the internal consistency test. 67 Internal consistency for the third prong
requires that if all states adopt the same tax, interstate commerce will
not be unduly burdened.68 But here, the Court concluded if all states
adopted the same tax as Pennsylvania, then interstate commerce, vis-d-
vis truckers traveling cross country, would be unduly burdened. In
order for a state tax to pass the internal consistency test, it must be able
to be applied by all states and not have "impermissible interference with
free trade." 69
The fourth and final prong of the Complete Auto test requires a tax to
be fairly related to the services provided by the state. This prong was
analyzed by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana. Montana had levied a severance tax on companies that were
extracting coal from Montana, and the taxpayer argued that the tax was
59. Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 847.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 849.
62. Id.
63. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 259 (1977).
64. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
65. Id. at 270.
66. Id. at 271.
67. Id. at 284.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984) (internal quotations omitted)).
70. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
71. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
2016]
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not fairly related to coal mining. 72 The taxpayer argued that because the
tax affected primarily corporations formed outside of Montana, and
because the tax was taxed at a higher rate than other industries, the tax
violated the constitution. 73  The Supreme Court disagreed with this
conclusion and held that "the only benefit to which the taxpayer is
constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the
privileges of living in an organized society, established and safeguarded
by the devotion of taxes to public purposes." 74 The Commerce Clause
does not prohibit a taxpayer engaged in interstate commerce from
paying a tax on their just share of state tax burden. The Court finally
looked at the measure in which the taxpayer was being taxed. The Court
held that because the taxpayer was being taxed in proportion to the
amount of coal they were removing from the state, it was reasonably
related to the activity in the state.
C. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides, in part, "Nor shall any State . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
law."75 Applying the Equal Protection Clause to state taxation, the
Supreme Court has held that as long as a tax has a rational basis, the tax
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
76
Determining whether a tax violated the Equal Protection Clause was
the central issue decided by the Supreme Court in Armour v. City of
Indianapolis. Indiana levied a tax on property owners for the cost of a
sewer improvement project. The taxpayers could pay the tax in a single
lump sum or over time in installment payments. In 2004, property
owners were given notice of the payment, but the tax was abandoned in
2005. The group of taxpayers that paid in lump sum were not refunded
their payments, but those that chose to pay in installments were forgiven
of all future payments. The group that paid in lump sum challenged the
tax under the Equal Protection Clause.
In Armour, the Supreme Court held that the tax statute did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause. 77 The Court found that the classification of
the taxpayers was not based on a fundamental right or suspect
classification, and therefore, the case fell into the prior precedent that
72. Id. at 612.
73. Id. at 613,617-18.
74. Id. at 623 (citing Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937)).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
76. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012).
77. Id. at 2080-81.
[VOL. 84
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held the tax was constitutional if "there is a plausible policy reason for
the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is
apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the
governmental decision maker, and the relationship of the classification
to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or
irrational., 78
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE CASES AND FTA REPORT
The Federation of Tax Administration created a task force on
nonresident income tax issues and submitted a report for
recommendations 79 because of the increasing number of states that had
begun to tax nonresident professional sports team members. The task
force partially attributed the increase in taxation of athletes to "the
visibility of team members, the relative ease with which their time in the
state and their employer can be identified, and team member salary
levels relative to the population as a whole." 81 The task force saw
compliance costs for the taxpayer and enforcement costs for
administrations as the primary concerns of taxing professional athletes. 82
The task force reviewed four options for taxation of professional
athletes and recommended a uniform apportionment formula based on
the duty days of the athlete. The alternative options were the home state
apportionment model, the base state model, and the partnership model.
In the home state apportionment, the taxpayer would attribute his
income to the state in which the home games were played.83 In the base
state model, the tax return would be filed only with the state where the
team was domiciled, and the state would be responsible for dividing the
relevant information and funds to all other states involved. In the
partnership model the "tax return filing responsibilities would be
satisfied through a composite or consolidated return filed on behalf of
all eligible team members. 84
The task force recommended that the states adopt a uniform method
of apportionment. 85  A uniform approach would remove compliance
78. Id. at 2080 (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
79. James W. Wetzler, State Income Taxation of Nonresident Professional Team Athletes: A
Uniform Approach, J. OF FED'N OF TAx ADMIN. (1994).
80. Id. at 1.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1-2.
83. Id. at n.9. This concept had considerable interest, but was found to be unconstitutional as it
would, "obligate the home state to require a nonresident to include in the tax base income derived from
services performed outside the state."
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burdens on taxpayers, as well as increase the likelihood of effective
collection. 86  The details of the recommendation were that
apportionment of income would be based on "the proportion of duV
days spent in the state compared to the duty says spent in all states '
and that the tax returns would be filed either through simplified
withholdings 88 or composite returns.89
Even before the task force was assembled and gave its
recommendation, courts had examined the methods of personal income
tax apportionment for professional athletes. In Stemkowski v.
Commissioner,9" the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals
looked at the games played method of tax allocation. The Treasury
regulations regarding federal tax interpretations state that income shall
be attributable to sources in the United States on a time basis.91
Stemkowski was a player in the National Hockey League for the New
York Rangers. 92 As a nonresident alien, Stemkowski was taxable on his
personal income that he earned, but only income attributable to the
United States. 93 The court was to determine if Stemkowski or the tax
commissioner applied a functional apportionment to Stemkowski's
income earned in the United States. 94
Stemkowski argued that his tax obligation to the United States should
be in proportion to the days he performed his duties in the United States,
used as the nominator, and the total number of days in a year, used as
the denominator.95 The rationale behind using all the days in the year as
the denominator in order to determine the percentage of days taxable to
the United States was that, even in the off-season, Stemkowski was
performing his contractual obligation to appear at training camp in good
condition and, therefore, every day of the year he was contractually
obligated to perform.96
The tax administrator argued, and the tax court agreed, that the plain
language of Stemkowski's contract's suggested that Stemkowski was
86. Id. at 2-3.
87. Id. at 3.
88. The professional teams would be required to withhold tax for each team member in each
taxing state.
89. "[A] composite tax return by the team on behalf of each nonresident team member in each
taxing state in which the team played games or services were performed." Wetzler, supra note 79,
at 5-4.
90. 690 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1982).
91. 26 C.F.R. § 1.861-4(b) (1975).
92. Stemkowski, 690 F.2d at 42.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 44-45.
96. Id. at 45.
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paid only to play in the NHL games, not stay in shape. 97 This was due
to the fact that a clause in the contract stated that a portion of his salary
would be forfeited equal to the ratio of the number of days of the
suspension to the total number of days scheduled with games.
98
Because Stemkowski was paid only to play the games, the proportion of
his salary that should be allocated to the United States should be in
proportion to the amount of games played in the United States divided
by the total number of games played, or the games played method of
allocation.
The Second Circuit rejected both analyses and overturned the tax
court's decision. 99 The court held that the tax court's findings were
clearly erroneous because there might have been other reasons the
contract used this formula to reduce salary other than paying players
only for the games they played in. 100 Moreover, the court found that
because the contract also fined players for failing to participate in
exhibition games and training camp, the plain language of the contract
suggested that the players were obligated to perform in more than just
league scheduled games. 101  But the court also found flaws in
Stemkowski's rationale that the off-season should be counted as an
obligated performance day, holding that "fitness is not a service
performed in fulfillment of the contract but a condition of
employment. '" 10 2
Thus, the court rejected both the holding by the tax court and
Sternkowski's recommendation. Instead, the court held that
Stemokowski was obligated to perform on all days during training
camp, the regular season, and playoff games. Days during the off-
season were not included by the court as days Stemkowski was
obligated to perform. Stemkowski was obligated to apportion his salary
in proportion to the amount of duty days he worked in the United States
by the amount of total duty days that were in the year, otherwise known
as the "duty days method." The final apportionment of personal income
to be taxed as United States source income for Stemkowski was 187
duty days' work10 3 divided by 234 total duty days. 104
97. Stemkowski, 690 F.2d at 45.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court noted it was administratively easier to deduct salaries this way, and it was a
way for the teams to maximize the salary penalty per day lost.
101. Id. at46.
102. See also Favell v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 700 (Cl. Ct. 1989). Favell involved a nonresident
alien hockey player, and the United States Court of Federal Claims noted that "professional athletes, like
members of all professions, are expected to maintain a minimum level of ability to perform, or else risk
losing their positions." Id. at 73-74.
103. Stemkowski, 690 F.2d at 45 (equaling 164 days of regular season plus 23 days of playoff
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Just as the federal court in Stemkowski decided the issue of
apportionment for a nonresident alien attributing days within the United
States, state courts have grappled with similar issues of apportioning
nonresident athletes' income to days of performance within their own
states. California has dealt with the issue for both athletes and
entertainers. In In re Carrol,105 the State Board of Equalization ruled on
the tax obligations of Joseph Carrol, a nonresident of California who
played for the Golden State Warriors between 1980 and 1982.106 Carrol
argued that the only days that should be apportioned to California
should be in equal proportion to the amount of games played in
California, equal to fifty-three and fifty percent in the 1980-1981 and
1981-1982 seasons, respectively. 107 The state argued that Carrol was
not only required to play in games, but was also required to participate
in team practices, training camp, and team travel. Therefore, by adding
in the duty days attributed to those activities, Carrol's apportioned
income attributed to California seventy-three percent in the 1980-1981
seasons and seventy percent in the 1981-1982 season.108
Because Carrol was a nonresident, he was responsible for
apportioning only the amount of his salary as income attributable to
California that was received for personal services performed within the
state. 109  The Board concluded that because athletes are paid for
practicing and traveling with the team and fined if they fail to do so, the
working day includes all practices, training sessions, and games
played.
The New York Division of Tax Appeals ruled in favor of the duty
days approach in In re Bickett.111 Here, the nonresident professional
football player apportioned his income by the duty days method, while
the Division of Taxation argued that the taxpayer's income should be
taxed on the games played method of allocation. 112 The court ruled that
the taxpayer had correctly allocated his income under the duty days rule
because, "the efforts required to earn that income certainly include
practice on practice days as required by the contract."' 113
hockey in the United States).
104. Id. (totaling 27 days of training camp, 179 days of regular season, and 28 days of playoff
hockey).
105. No. 85A-684-SW, 1987 WL 50144 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Apr. 7, 1987).
106. Id. at *1.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *2.
110. Carroll, 1987 WI 50144, at *2.
111. No. 813160, 1996 WL 54179 (N.Y. Div. T.A. Feb. 1, 1996).
112. Id. at *1.
113. Id. at *3.
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V. HILLENMEYER AND SATURDAY
The Ohio Supreme Court has decided two cases brought by former
NFL players alleging that they were taxed in violation of the United
States and Ohio Constitutions. 114  Hunter Hillenmeyer, a former
linebacker for the Chicago Bears, and Jeff Saturday, a former center for
the Indianapolis Colts, were taxed on 1/20th of their income by the City
of Cleveland for their teams' participation in an NFL game played in
Cleveland. Neither is a resident of Cleveland, Ohio.115
Both parties challenged Cleveland's tax claiming that the 1/20th
apportionment violates the United States Constitution. 116 The city had
used the games played method to apportion the amount of tax owed by
athletes playing in Cleveland. Cleveland's tax administrative authority
provided and enforced regulations that required athletes to allocate
income based on the games played method of allocation. 117  1/20th of
each player's annual salary was therefore attributed to have been earned
in the city of Cleveland. The numerator of the apportionment was the
amount of games played in Cleveland, and the denominator is the games
that their teams played in a year." 18  The players argued that the
regulation was an unfair apportionment of their salary because they are
contractually obligated to work more than just on game days. Instead,
the players suggested that their taxation should be based on "duty days,"
increasing the denominator to include all days that the players are
obligated to perform services for their employers. Hillenmeyer argued
that his taxable income in Cleveland should be reduced from 5% (1/20)
to 1.27%119 in 2004, 1.21% in 2005120, and 1.19%12 1 in 2006.122
Saturday's case had even larger tax implications. Saturday was injured
in 2008 and did not travel with the team to Cleveland. Therefore, under
the duty days method of apportionment, Saturday argued that he should
not be taxed for any services performed in Cleveland because he was not
contractually obligated to perform in Cleveland. 123
114. Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland Bd. of Review, 41 N.E.3d 1164 (Ohio 2015); Saturday v.
Cleveland Bd. of Review, 33 N.E.3d 46 (Ohio 2015).
115. Hillenmeyer, 41 N.E.3d at 170; Saturday, 33 N.E.3d at 47.
116. Hillenmeyer, 41 N.E.3d at 166-67; Saturday, 33 N.E.3d at47.
117. Id. at 170 ("Cleveland imposes a 2 percent tax on the income that is allocable to
Cleveland. See Cleveland Codified Ordinances 191.0501. CCA Regulation 8:02(E)(6) sets forth a
games-played method to allocate the income of a nonresident professional athlete such as
Hillenmeyer.").
118. Including the sixteen regular season games, plus the four pre-season games.
119. Hillenmeyer performed services in Cleveland for 2 out of 157 duty days.
120. Hillenmeyer performed services in Cleveland for 2 out of 165 duty days.
121. Hillenmeyer performed services in Cleveland for 2 out of 168 duty days.
122. Hillenmeyer, 41 N.E.3d 170.
123. Brief of the Appellant Jeffrey B. Saturday and Karen R. Saturday at 1, 14, Saturday v.
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Beyond unfair allocation of income, the plaintiffs in the Ohio cases
also argued that a statute, Ohio Revised Code 718.01 1(B), discriminated
against their profession and therefore violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. 124 In Ohio, nonresidents are
not responsible for Ohio income tax unless they perform services in the
state for at least twelve days. At the time the case was argued, Ohio
Revised Code 718.011(B) made an exception to this rule and taxed
athletes and entertainers on any services performed within the state,
regardless of whether or not they performed services in the state for at
least twelve days. 125  Hillenmeyer and Saturday argued that these
statutes treat professional athletes differently from other similarly
situated taxpayers and therefore is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. 12
6
This special Ohio personal income tax does not only affect National
Football League players in Ohio and Cleveland, but all athletes in all
sports. Hillenmeyer's and Saturday's cases were supported by an
amicus brief written jointly by the National Football League Players
Association, the Major League Baseball Players Association, the
National Hockey League Players Association, and National Basketball
League Players Association. The brief first argues that athletes are
unfairly singled out from other high paying service industries without a
proper justification. 128  The brief continues to argue that although
athletes may have a larger salary than many other professions, they
should not be singled out solely for this, because their profession is
more dangerous in nature than other professions, resulting in the average
careers being much shorter than any other profession. 129
The Ohio Supreme Court made its decision, and ruled against the
games played method of apportionment, but upheld Ohio Revised Code
718.011(B)."' The court ruled that the games played method did
violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution because
"it foreseeably imposes Cleveland income tax on compensation earned
Cleveland Bd. of Review, 33 N.E.3d 46 (Ohio 2015) (No. 14-0292).
124. Hillenmeyer, 41 N.E.3d 172; Brief of the Appellant Jeffrey B. Saturday, supra note 123, at
47.
125 Effective January 1, 2016, Ohio Revised Code §718 was revised changing twelve days to
twenty days.
126. Brief of the Appellant B. Jeffrey Saturday, supra note 123, at 47; Brief of Appellant Hunter
T. Hillenmeyer at 34, Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland Bd. of Review, 41 N.E.3d 1164 (Ohio 2015) (No. 14-
0235).
127. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Football League Players Association, et al., Hillenmeyer v.
ClevelandBd. of Review, 41 N.E.3d 1164 (Ohio 2015) (No. 14-0235).
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id. at 5 ("In the NFL, for example, the average length of a player's career is about three and
one-half years.")
130. Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland Bd. of Review, 41 N.E.3d 1164, 1177 (Ohio 2015).
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while .. .working outside Cleveland." 131 The court did not reach the
athlete's Commerce Clause arguments because the court ruled that the
Due Process Clause argument was dispositive on the issue.132 The court
followed its ruling from a previous case relating to whether an athlete is
compensated only for the games the athlete plays in the year or is
compensated based on the "duty days." 133 The court said that the "duty
days" method did correctly allocate the correct amount of income to the
state and city.
The athletes were not able to escape the state and local taxes
completely. The court ruled that the statute that singled out athletes and
performers did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 134 The court
reasoned that there was no Constitutional violation because"professional athletes are typically highly paid, and their work is easy to
find, so that a city could earn significant revenue with comparative ease"
together with the fact that "the legislature could rationally find that
professional athletes and entertainers and their events incur much larger
public burdens relating to police protection and traffic and crowd
control, among other public services, than do other occasional
entrants." 135
Other state and federal courts have previously ruled that the allocating
income according to duty days is more rational to the amount of work
performed in a state than the games played method. The Hillenmeyer
and Saturday cases highlight these arguments. The Ohio cases were
slightly different from previous cases in that the state and local
legislative bodies empowered an executive agency to create and enforce
regulations to determine proper allocation of income. The court did not
just rule that the duty days method was more rational than the games
played method, but ruled that the games played method was not
Constitutional.
VI. IS THE GAMES PLAYED METHOD OF TAXING PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
CONSTITUTIONAL?
The games played method of apportionment for personal income of
athletes has not been popular among legislative bodies or courts.
However, with states and localities becoming more aggressive in tax
collection, it would not be unexpected for them to switch to the games
played method of apportioning personal income for professional athletes
131. Id. at 1177 (Ohio 2015).
132. Id. at 1778.
133. Id. at 1777 (citing Hume v. Limbach, 575 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio 1991)).
134d.aId 1773.
135. Hillenmeyer, 41 N.E.3d at 1773.
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in the future if they believed the statute could be upheld. Regardless,
the question remains: Is the games played method constitutional? This
was the issue brought up in the Hillenmeyer and Saturday cases when
the city of Cleveland levied a tax on their income according to the
games played method. Other federal and state courts have assessed the
argument between the games played and duty days methods of
apportionment, but they have only considered which method more fairly
represented how income should be allocated within a state. The Ohio
Supreme Court made the ruling that the games played method of
allocating income was in violation of the United States Constitution.
This section will analyze whether the Ohio Supreme Court's decision
was correct, and whether legislatures that in the future impose a tax on
athletes according to the games played method would have
Constitutional justification.
A. Due Process Consideration for the Games Play Method of
Apportionment
The two main Due Process issues in relation to state taxation are: (1)
The Due Process Clause requires a state to establish that a taxpayer has
minimum contacts with a state and (2) a tax on personal income must be"rationally related to values connected with the taxing State." 136 An
athlete that is paid for services performed in the state and enters a state
to perform such services has established minimum contact with that
state. The taxpayer has personally availed himself to the state by
entering it and has come to enjoy the benefits and protections of the
state. The facts behind the Saturday case raise an interesting issue of
whether a professional athlete who does not travel with the team, and
does not enter the state, has established minimum contacts with that
state. The Supreme Court has said that minimum contacts are
established by "some definite link, some minimum contact between a
state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax." 137 A
professional athlete may argue that he or she should not be subjected to
a state's taxation if he or she did not enter the state to perform any
services. But this argument does not look at the transaction that is being
taxed. A professional athlete's salary can be fairly attributed to the
games that are played in a season. This is the service that the athlete is
providing for his team. An athlete is also paid this amount if the
player's team performs without the player. Although Saturday did not
personally play in the game, his salary is based on the game being
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played, and the state has made that game being played possible. As
discussed in Part I, the cost to a municipality exceeds just the cost that
the public pays for the stadium. The cost to a municipality to provide a
stadium for these players to be able to perform their service also
includes the infrastructure costs and municipal services that are required
for each game to be played. Because the transaction between the
player's service and the team is made possible only by the benefits
provided by the state, Ohio and Cleveland have a rational basis to tax
the transaction between a player and his team when the player's team
enters the Ohio to play a game.
Athletes will object to the games played method of allocation,
especially when the method is not the majority position. The negative
effect a minority method of allocation will have on athletes can be
displayed using a hypothetical. If an athlete is taxed in his home state
using the duty days method, he would be taxed on more than half of his
income. 13 8 If all away games that the athlete was contracted to perform
in took place in states levying taxes on out of state players using the
games played method of apportionment, then the athlete would be taxed
on half of his income by those states. 139  This hypothetical would
subject the athlete to state taxation on over 100% of his income. But as
the Supreme Court has said, the possible occurrence of double taxation
alone is not enough to make a tax be in violation of the Due Process
Clause. 140
The Supreme Court has made the ruling that a tax levied will not be
in violation of the Due Process Clause if the "state has adopted a method
not intrinsically arbitrary." 141 No argument by a taxpayer suggests that
the games played method of apportionment is intrinsically arbitrary.
Other courts have ruled that the duty days method is more rational
according to the way that the contract is written. But those courts have
not suggested that a statute authorizing a games played method of
apportionment would be so incomprehensible that any statute promoting
the games played method of apportionment should be overturned.
Professional athletes are paid for their services performed in games.
Other activities, such as practices and meetings, are auxiliary to this
main event, and taxing athletes on the primary events pertaining to the
services they provide is rational. The games played method of
138. This is making the assumption that half of the athlete's games are played in the home state,
and practices and other team meetings that the player is obligated by his contract to perform are also
performed in the same state.
139. Making the assumption that half the scheduled games are played at home in the athlete's
home state, and half the scheduled games are played in a visitor's stadium.
140. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1939); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305
U.S. 19, 23 (1938)).
141. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. N.C. ex rel Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 133 (193 1)).
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apportionment is not the only coherent way of apportionment of a
player's salary, but it is one rational method of apportionment and a
statute authorizing its use should not be overruled by a court from Due
Process consideration.
B. Commerce Clause Consideration for the Games Play Method of
Apportionment
An analysis of the games played method of apportionment in light of
the Commerce Clause requires an examination of the four Complete
Auto prongs. For a state to levy a tax using the games played method of
apportionment, the tax must: (1) have substantial nexus; (2) be fairly
apportioned; (3) not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4)
be fairly related to the services provided by the state. 142
The Supreme Court has held that the substantial nexus requirement is
a different standard from the minimum contacts standard for sales and
use tax. A physical presence test was the test upheld in Quill for a state
to have minimum contacts with a state. Although an argument could be
made that a physical presence test is the standard for substantial nexus
for all state and local taxes, it seems unlikely in the personal income
taxation context. Quill's holding was decided partly through the
doctrines of stare decisis and detrimental reliance. Contrastingly, no
case has been decided by the Supreme Court using the physical presence
test for personal income taxation, making stare decisis and detrimental
reliance irrelevant. Lower courts have read Quill narrowly, applying the
holding from Quill only to sales and use tax.144  To the point that
athletes would have a difficult argument proving they do not have a
substantial nexus with a state, Brent Hillenmeyer did not challenge the
constitutionality of the games played method of apportionment under
the first prong of Complete Auto in his merit brief.
The next prong of Complete Auto requires a tax to be fairly
apportioned to the activity conducted in the state. The games played
method of apportionment must be both internally and externally
consistent. The games played method of apportionment is internally
consistent, because if every state applied the method, there would not be
double taxation on an athlete's income. A state would be justified in
apportioning the amount of income in proportion to the amount of
games played in the state by the total amount of games played. The
games played method draws a bright-line on what can be apportioned to
142. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
143. The mail in order industry had relied on the physical presence test for over twenty years.
144. See Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006).
145. Brief of Appellant Hunter T. Hillenmeyer, supra note 126, at 31.
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a state and would not result in double taxation.
The games played method is also externally consistent. A tax is
externally consistent when the state's justification for taxation is
attributable to the economic activity within the state. The burden is on
the taxpayer to show that the tax has been grossly distorted. Arguments
on this issue are similar to those for apportionment discussed for due
process. Because the games played method is one rational method of
apportioning income, the taxpayer would not be able to argue that the
tax was grossly distorted and, therefore, the athletes cannot argue that
the tax was externally inconsistent.
To pass the third prong of the Complete Auto test, the games played
method must not discriminate against interstate commerce. This method
of apportionment applies to both resident and nonresident athletes that
perform their services in the state and, therefore, it does not facially
discriminate against nonresident taxpayers. Furthermore, the games
played method, if adopted by all states, would not unduly burden
interstate commerce. As the internal consistency test of the second
prong showed, a taxpayer would not be subject to double taxation if
used by all states, but would be subject to personal income tax on his
whole salary, divided proportionally among the states in which he
played. Thus, the third prong of the test would also pass Constitutional
muster.
The final prong of the Complete Auto test requires the games played
method of apportionment to be fairly related to the services provided by
the state. The Supreme Court has held that for a tax to be fairly related
to the state, the constitutional bar only requires that "the only benefit to
which the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived from his
enjoyment of the privileges of living in an organized society, established
and safeguarded by the devotion of taxes to public purposes." 4 6 As
mentioned in Part I, the costs to cities and states for providing arenas for
athletes to perform in is a significant burden to bear. Not only is the
cost of the structure and land shouldered mostly by public finance, but
cities and states also are often responsible for paying the ongoing costs
of operations, including an increase in municipal services. Athletes
directly benefit from the public providing these stadiums and
operational costs. Furthermore, as the out of state coal companies
benefitted in Commonwealth Edison, athletes also benefit from entering
a state being able to perform services in a living society, with all the
normal protections provided by the state.
A counter-argument that athletes might assert is that being taxed on
their income is not fairly related to the services provided by the state
146. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
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because athletes are not the only group of people directly benefitting
from the services provided by the state. It is true that the owners of
sports franchises, as well as the fans that participate in sporting events,
also benefit from the services provided by the state. But this fact has
little to do with whether a tax on professional athletes is fairly
apportioned to their income. What matters is whether the measure of
the tax is proportional to the services provided by the state.
Like the other prongs of the Complete Auto test, the measure of the
tax being fairly apportioned relies heavily on whether the games played
method is a rational method of apportionment. As stated previously, the
games played method is one rational method of apportionment. An
athlete in the NFL receives income from the games in which his team is
scheduled to play. That athlete derives benefits from each state that is
providing services to make those games possible. Like the severance
tax in Commonwealth Edison, the games played method is in proportion
to the amount of use the taxpayer has in the state and, therefore, is
reasonably related to the activity in the state.
VII. EQUAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATION FOR THE STATE AND LOCAL
STATUTES THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES AND
ENTERTAINERS
Ohio is one of several states with a statutory provision setting a
different standard for athletes than the rest of the tax base in terms of the
required time to be in a state to be responsible for paying taxes on
personal income. 14 7 Athletes may argue that this is a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
The first step of determining whether the Equal Protection Clause has
been violated is to determine the standard of review. Athletes are not a
classification based on a fundamental right, thus the tax on such a class
will be reviewed on a rational basis. As the Supreme Court stated in
Armour, a tax under rational review will be constitutional if there is
plausible policy reason for the classification, the facts surrounding the
classification are true, and the relationship between the class and the
state's goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or
irrational.
One plausible policy reason for the distinction between athletes and
other taxpayers is the simplicity of the distinction. A tax on athletes
based on games played in the state provides a small burden on the
taxpayer in terms of compliance and is easily enforceable by the taxing
147. LEXISNEXIS, LEXIS MULTISTATE TAX CHARTS WITH ANALYSIS: PERSONAL INCOME TAX:
TAXATION OF ATHLETES AND ENTERTAINERS (2014).
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institutions. It is readily apparent for both the taxpayer and the
enforcement agency where an athlete performs the service of playing in
a game. Furthermore, another policy reason for distinguishing between
athletes and other taxpayers is because the tax on athletes is directly
connected with the costs on the public that enable them to perform their
services. These policy considerations are not arbitrarily assigned and
are more than enough to meet the relatively low rational basis threshold
required by the Equal Protection Clause.
VIII. CONCLUSION
If a state and local tax is not in violation of a taxpayer's
Constitutional rights then a court cannot reject the tax. Our federal
system has given state legislatures the right to impose taxes that are not
otherwise in violation of the Constitution. As discussed above, the
games played method of apportionment and statutes that single out
professional athletes are not in violation of the Constitution. Therefore,
the court system is not the forum to institute change on these issues.
It is worth noting that when an athlete is subject to taxes on personal
income in multiple states and by multiple localities, the cost of
compliance increases. Unfortunately for the taxpayer, this is the result
of a federal taxing system that gives jurisdictions the right to impose
their own taxing statutes. However, the proper forum to address these
issues is not through the courts, but through state or federal legislative
bodies. As Justice Scalia wrote in the majority opinion of Quill, the
decision to not overturn the state tax at issues was "made easier by the
fact that the underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better
qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to
resolve." 148 If compliance with state taxation for athletes is a major
concern, then Congress has the power and is in the position to make
such a change. Furthermore, states are free to adopt a uniform approach
to state taxation and to collectively adopt a uniform approach such as the
one suggested by the Federal Tax Administration.
As states continually look to balance their budgets, aggressive
enforcement and new statutes will be passed to increase the amount of
revenue for the state. Professional athletes are among society's highest
paid employees, and, because of their visibility, are potentially easy
targets for states to collect taxes on their personal income. This
Comment illustrates that both the games played method of apportioning
player's income, as well as statutes that single out professional athletes,
are constitutional. Current and future challenges of these issues cannot
148. Quill, v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
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be resolved in the courtroom, but must be made through legislative
bodies.
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